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THE LIABILITY OF AN ATTORNEY FOR
ERRONEOUS ADVICE.
MUNSON PRIZE THESIS.
In treating this subject it is proposed to confine the discussion
to the liability of attorneys-at-law for advice upon matters within
the scope of their professional duties. For a discussion of the
liability of attorneys-in-fact opens the entire subject of the law of
agency, and a discussion of the liability of attorneys-at-law for
advice upon matters of fact without the scope of their profession
1
could result in a little more than the enunciation of the common-
sense rule that for the soundness of such advice they are not usu-
ally held liable at all. But they may be liable under an express
contract 2 creating such liability, or where such advice amounts to
a fraudulent 3 misrepresentation of a matter of fact, reasonably
relied upon by the other party, and thereby causing such party
pecuniary loss, the liability of attorneys-at-law herein being the
same as that of non-professional men.
Where the distinction between attorneys and solicitors on the
one hand and counsellors or advocates on the other prevails, as in
England and to some extent in the United States Courts and the
Courts of New Jersey,4 the counsellors or advocates are not liable
to their clients at all in an action, provided they act honestly with
a view to their clients' interests. They are liable neither for igno-
rance of law nor for any mistake of fact.
5
If an attorney or solicitor enters into an express contract with
his client, guaranteeing, for a valuable consideration, the correct-
ness of his advice, no reason appears why he should not be held
to answer for all the damages actually resulting to his client by rea-
l Such advice would be merely the expression of an opinion upon matters
with respect to which the attorney is not specially qualified to speak. Cooley
on Torts, 565-8, 2d ed.; 2 Kent Com. 485; 2 Parsons on Contracts, 778-9.
2 Cf. Domats Civil Law by Strahan, Cushing's ed. § 1137.
8 Cf. Domat's Civil Law, sufira: Cooley on Torts, 555, 556, 2d ed.
4 Shearman and Redfield on Negligence, 4th ed., vol. II., § 557; I9 Amer.
Law Rev. 677-
5 Bishop on Non-Contract Law, § 704; Swinfen v'. Chelmsford, 5 Hurl. &
N. 89o, 924 (i86o); Pitt v. Yalden, 4 Burr. 2oo (1767); Shearman and Red-
field on the Law of Negligence, 4th ed., vol. II., § 557, and cases cited; 28
Amer. Law Reg. 537, note; Purves v. Landell, 12 CL. & F. 9r.
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son of a bonafide reliance upon such advice. For, when public pol-
icy or the law of the State are not thereby violated, consemus facit
legem. No case upon this exact point has been found. But in sev-
eral well-considered cases 8 there are important dicta which would
undoubtedly be regarded as correct statements of the law.
The relation of attorney and client usually arises, not from
express contract,7 but from the consultation of the attorney and
the payment to him of a retaining fee. And even if there be an
express contract to create such relation, the attorney does not
thereby impliedly guarantee the soundness of his advice or the
success of legal proceedings to be instituted by him.8 Under
these circumstances the mutual rights and liabilities of attorney
and client depend upon quasi-contract (i. e., the contract which the
law implies) or upon the duty 9 which the law imposes upon all
who enter into that relationship. The obligation of the quasi-
contract and that of the legal duty are identical; and for the com-
plete discharge of either he must possess and exercise a reasonable
degree of skill, diligence and care10 in the exercise of his profes-
6 Babbitt v. Bumpus (73 Mich. 331), 16 Amer. St. Rep. 585, 588; Doster
v. Scully, 27 Fed. Rep. 782; Purves v. Landell, 12 Clark & F. 9i: cf. Weeks
on Attorneys-at-Law, § 317, and authorities cited.
7 Weeks on Attorneys, N 183, 185-7.
8 Weeks on Attorneys, § 290; Purves v. Landell, 12 Clark & F. 91; Doster
V'. Scully, 27 Fed. R. 782; Babbitt v. Bumpus (73 Mich. 331), z6 Amer. St.
Rep. 585.
9 3 Black. Com. 163, 164; National Savings Bank v. Ward, ioo U. S. I95;
Dundee Mortgage, etc., Co. vi,. Hughes, 2o Fed, R. 39; see also infra the
authorities cited in notes 35 and 36.
10 Robinson's Elementary Law, § 2II; 3 Black. Com. 26, note 4 in Cooley's
3d ed.; 3 Black. Com. 164, note io, same ed.; National Savings Bank v.
Ward, ioo U. S. x95; Dundee Mortgage, etc., Co. v. Hughes, 20 Fed. R. 39;
Cox v. Sullivan, 5o Amer. Dec. 386 (7 Ga. 144); Goodman '. Walker (3o Ala.
482), 68 Amer. Dec. 134; Pennington's Ex'rs v. Yell (ii Ark. 212), 52 Amer.
Dec. 262; Fitch v. Scott [3 How. (Miss.) 314], 34 Amer. Dec. 86; Gambert v.
Hart, 44 Cal. 542; 34 Amer. Dec. 89, note, containing many citations of author-
ities; Citizen's Loan, etc., Ass'n v. Friedley (123 Ind. 143), i8 Amer. St. Rep.
320; Babbitt v. Bumpus (73 Mich. 331), 16 Amer. St. Rep. 585, 588; Ahlhauser
v. Butler et al., 57 Fed. Rep. i2; 28 Amer, Law Reg. 536, note; Thomas v.
Schee, 8o Iowa 237; Cochrane v: Little (71 Md. 323), i8 AtI. Rep. 698; Cooley
on Torts 648-650; Parker v. Rolls, 14 C. B. 691; Holmes v. Peck, i R. I. 242;
Dearborn v. Dearborn, 15 Mass. 316; Varnum v. Martin, i5 Pick. 440; A. B.'s
Estate, x Tuck. 247 (N. Y. Surrogate); Whitney v. Martine, 88 N. Y. 535, 538;
Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, Vol. II., §§ 558-9; Pitt v. Yalden, 4
Burr. 2060; Godefroy v. Dalton, 6 Bing. 46o; Hart v. Frame, 6 Cl. & F. 193,
2o9, 2io; Eggleston v. Boardman, 37 Mich. i4; Stevens v. Walker, 55 Ill. xSi,
S. C. 79 Ill. x93; Weeks on Attorneys, §§ 284-5; Bishop on Non-Contract Law,
§ 705. In some States there are statutes laying down similar rules.
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sion, and conduct himself therein with the strictest integrity.
1 '
And what is reasonable skill, diligence, and care in any given case
depends upon all the circumstances of that case.Y The attorney
cannot, in general, delegate his authority, nor can he, in the
absence of express contract, avoid responsibility for the negli-
gence or fraud of his clerks, agents, or partners.'
8 He cannot,
without his client's consent, make his own agents to be the agents
of his client, and directly responsible to the latter. Their negli-
gence and fraud within the scope of the duties entrusted to him
by his client and by him to them are his negligence and fraud.
Therefore, in the discussion following no distinction is to be made
between the attorney's fraud or negligence and that of his clerks
or partners.
The breach of the quasi-contract for, or legal duty of, integrity
in the management of his client's affairs by the attorney's giving
erroneous advice is usually fraud or breach of trust. And there
can be few grosser breaches of the attorney's oath of office and
legal duty than the fraudulent giving of erroneous advice to his
client. For any loss that befalls the client by reason of fraudulent
advice, the attorney will be held responsible in an appropriate
action. 14 The duty which rests upon him as an officer of the Court
and a man learned in the law takes him out of the reason, and
11 Robinson's Elementary Law, § 211; 3 Black. Com. 164; Mills v. Mills, 26
Conn. 219; Doster v. Scully, 27 Fed. Rep. 782; Exharte Giberson, 4 Cranch.'s
C. C. Rep. 503, 5o6; Purves v. Landell, x2 CL & F. gi; Fairfield County Bar
v. Taylor (6o Conn. Xi), 22 AtL Rep. 41; Cooley on Torts, 6x6, 618, 2d ed.;
Pisani v. Attorney-General for Gibraltar, L. R. 5 P. C. 5x6; Bispham on
Equity, §§ 92. 93, 231-2, 236, 238; z Swift's Digest 548-9; 1 Comyn's Digest
758; Weeks on Attorneys, §% 258, 268; Williams v. Reed, 3 Mason 404, 418;
Bishop on Non-Contract Law, § 7o6; examine State statutes.
12 Cox v. Sullivan (7 Ga. 144), 5o Amer. Dec. 386; 34 Amer. Dec. go, note;
Babbitt v,. Bumpus (73 Mich. 331), x6 Amer. St. Rep. 585, 589; Hart v. Frame,
6 Cl. & F. 193, 209-1o; Eggleston v. Boardman, 37 Mich. 14; Cochrane v. Lit-
tie (71 Md. 323), x8 Atl. Rep. 698; Weeks on Attorneys, § 285.
18 Dickson v. Wright (52 Miss. 585), 24 Amer. Rep. 677; Smalley v. Greene
(52 Iowa, 241), 35 Amer. Rep. 267; Rust v. Larue (4 Littell, 412), 14 Amer.
Dec. 172; Cornelius v. Wash (Breese, 98), 12 Amer. Dec. 145; 14 Fed. Rep.
786, note; 28 Amer. Law Reg. 542, note; Weeks on.Attorneys, § 244-247.
14 Weeks on Attorneys, § 259; x Swift's Digest, 558-9; 1 Comyn's Digest,
758; Cooley on Torts, 6x6-8, 2d ed.; 3 Black. Com. 163-4; Perry on Trusts,
§§ 202-3, 4 th ed.; Fairfield County Bar v. Taylor (60 Conn. ii), 22 Atl.
Rep. 441; Howells Annotated Stat. of Mich. § 7182; National Savings Bank
v. Ward, xoo U. S. 95; Doster v. Scully, 27 Fed. Rep. 782; cf Domat's
Civil Law by Strahan, § 1137.
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therefore out of the operation, of the rule which holds misrepre-
sentation of a matter of law with intent to deceive not to be such
fraud as to afford ground for rescission of a contract or for an
action of deceit. 15 Matters of law are the facts with which he
deals. And he is probably liable for the correctness of his
opinions even concerning these facts, provided they be given in
the performance of professional duty, and with the expectation
that they will be relied upon. 16 The Court also will not suffer
such an affront to its dignity to remain unnoticed, but will sum-
marily mete out justice to its offending officer.17
If the attorney does not have, or, though possessing, does not
exercise reasonable and ordinary knowledge, skill and diligence in
the practice of the law, and in consequence thereof erroneously.
advises his client, such ignorance or such failure to employ his
knowledge is held to be actionable negligence. 18 Any loss which
the client may suffer in consequence of such negligent advice may
be recovered from the attorney.19 This rule is almost universally
recognized where the English common law affords the basis of the
legal system. In all cases of this sort the right of action is founded
on negligence; 0 and the real question at issue is whether or not,
in view of all the circumstances of the individual cause, the attor-
ney is guilty of negligence.2 1 In the decided cases the point is
15 Cooley on Torts, 568, 2d ed. and note; 2 Parsons on Contracts, 786;
Benjamin's Prin. of Contracts, 75; Hickey v. Morrell, 102 N. Y. 454.
16 Cooley on Torts, 567, 2d ed. ; 2 Parsons on Contracts, 778-9.
17 Fairfield County Bar v. Taylor (6o Conn. ii), 22 At. Rep. 44r; 3
Black. Com. 29; Cooley on Torts, 616-8, 2d ed.; Perry on Trusts, § 846, 4th
ed.; i Comyn's Dig. 754.
18 National Savings Bank v. Ward, ioo U. S. 195-this case by inference
supports the proposition stated; Dundee Mortgage, etc., Co. v. Hughes, 20
Fed. R. 39; Citizens' Loan Fund, etc., Ass'n 7v. Friedley (123 Ind. z43), 18
Amer. St. Rep. 320; cf. Hilleglass, Adm'r v. Bender, 78 Ind. 225; Doster v.
Scully, 27 Fed. Rep. 782; Chase et a. 7v. Heaney, 70 Il. 268; 28 Amer. Law
Reg. 544, note citing Gihon v. Albert & Shaw, 7 Paige (N. Y. Ch.) 278;
Estate of A. B., i Tuck. (N. Y. SurM.) 247; Balkie 7v. Chandless, 3 Camp. 17,
20; 1 Parsons on Contracts, 114; Cochrane v. Little et at (71 Md. 323) 18
Atl. Rep. 698; 2 Shearman & Redfield on Neg., § 574, 4th ed.; Thomas v'.
Schee, 8o Iowa, 237; Purves v. Landell, 12 Cl. & F. 91; Kemp v. Burt, 4
Barn. & Ad. 424. And he is liable even if he advises gratuitously, Donaldson
vz. Haldane, 7 CL. & F. 762, 770-772; cf. Weeks on Attorneys, § 304, 311-313.
19 See cases cited in preceding note.
20 Weeks on Attorneys, § 283; 3 Black. Com. 164; also the cases cited in
note z8.
21 Whiteman v. Hawkins, L. R. 4 C. P. Div. 13, 19; cf. Weeks on Attor-
neys, §§ 283, 285; also cases cited in note 12.
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much mooted as to whether or not attorneys are liable to respond
in damages to their clients save for the consequences of gross neg-
ligence. Since the establishment of the modern theory that any
failure to exercise the care and skill demanded by all the facts of a
given case is actionable negligence,-" any discussion of the degrees
of negligence is of doubtful advantage. Yet in this instance it
will not be amiss to consider a few of the leading cases. An
examination of the American cases shows that our courts are now
practically unanimous in holding attorneys to the exercise of
reasonable and ordinary skill and diligence in the performance of
all professional duties.2
8  This rule, if we recognize the "degrees
of negligence," would make American attorneys liable for ordinary
negligence, though, in some of the caseg cited, the courts have
called such negligence gross, basing their opinions upon English
authorities.
The English decisions are nearly unanimous in fixing liability
upon attorneys only when they are chargeable with "gross negli-
gence, crassa negligenia." 2
4 But this apparent difference in the
English and American rules of law lies chiefly in the different
terminology employed to characterize similar states of fact. For
in the English cases we find "gross negligence" constantly spoken
of as the failure to use "due and reasonable skill and care; "2 and
the cases wherein we find attorneys held not liable are precisely
like those American cases in which attorneys are acquitted of all
negligence. It would appear from this, that the English attor-
neys are in fact held to quite as strict a performance of profes-
sional duty as are their American brethren.
Much misconception of the English rule has apparently resulted
from inaccurate reading of Lord Mansfield's opinion in the case of
Pitt v. Yalden.2 6 This case came up on an application for a sum-
mary rule that the attorney should pay the debt for which suit was
brought and costs of action, because of his mistake upon a point
of law which had been settled in the higher courts. Lord Mans-
22 Anderson's Dictionary of Law, p. 704, under "gross, ordinary, and
slight negligence."
28 See American cases and authorities cited in note io; contra, Lynch v.
Commonwealth, z6 Serg. & R. 368.
24 Cooley on Torts, 778, 2d ed.; Crosby v. Murphy, 8 Irish C. L. R. 301,
3xo; the English cases cited in note zo; Purves v,. Landell, 12 C. & F. 9x,
IO2; Bulwer v. Gilman, 4 M. & G. io8, 125; Baikie v. Chandless, 3 Camp. 17,
2o; Laidler v. Elliott, 3 B. & C. 738; Weeks on Attorneys, §§ 285, 293.
25 See the authorities cited in the preceding note.
28 4 Burr. 2060.
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
field, in that case, lays down the rule as follows: "An attorney
ought not to be liable, in cases of reasonable doubt." Here the
law was settled, but the attorney was from the country and prob-
ably did not know of the recent decisions settling the point. So
his lordship says, "I think it is not a clear case enough for the
court to proceed in a summary way. * * * In this case the
plaintiff ought to be left to his action." Neither the fact nor the
quantity of the debt sued for had been ascertained, and the point
really decided was, that under these circumstances the attorney
should not be held liable in a summary way, in the absence of suf-
ficiently gross negligence.
In Crosbie v. Murphy,2 it is said that an attorney is not liable
for a less degree than gross negligence. But, in Parker v. Rolls,23
an attorney is declared responsible for the exercise of a reasonable
amount of care and skill; and in Godefroy v. Dalton,2 Tindal, C.
J., in attempting to trace the dividing line between reasonable
skill and diligence on the one hand, and gross negligence on the
other, says, that an attorney is not liable "for error in judgment
upon points of new occurrences, or of nice or doubtful construc-
tion, or of such as are usually intrusted to men in the higher
branch of the profession of the law."
An examination of the American cases and authorities hitherto
cited shows, that the rule here declared is very generally accepted
by the courts of this country, as containing a correct exposition of
the law. In the comparatively recent case of Whiteman v. Haw-
kins,80 Denman, J., in commenting on the judge's charge in the
lower court, said: "If his judgment turned upon any supposed
distinction between different degrees of negligence,-if he thought
that to render the defendant liable to substantial damages it was
necessary to establish gross negligence as contradistinguished
from a want of due care and attention to his business as a solicitor,
- I think he was wrong." 1
But attorneys who, in good faith, advise their clients errone-
ously as to the rule of law, whether written or unwritten, its
existence, interpretation, or application, where its uncertainty in
these respects is so great as to render probable a disagreement
upon it among lawyers of average learning, ability and diligence,
27 8 Irish C. L. 3O.
28 14 C. B. 691.
29 6 Bing. 46o.
80 L. R., 4 C. P. Div. 13.
81 Ibidem, p. x9.
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are not liable to make good any losses that may come to their
clients by reason of the latter relying upon such advice.82
Thus in Marsh v. Whitmore,as an attorney, who accepted as
law the decision of the highest court in his State, was held not to
be chargeable with negligence in acting upon such decision in
advance of a contrary decision upon the same point, by the United
States Supreme Court.
The usual remedy for the client who is injured by the unskill-
ful or negligent advice of his attorney is an action at law for dam-
ages.84 Where the common law system of pleading prevails, the
action in which relief is usually sought is trespass on the case,
85 or
assumpsit,38 the former basing the right of action on the breach
of a legal duty, the latter on the breach of the implied or quasi-
contract. Under code pleading, the civil action,87 of course would
be employed. Under either system the question of negligence
is left to the determination of the jury, under proper instruc-
tions by the court.3 3 The proper party plaintiff, and, where
82 Weeks on Attorneys, §§ 2o--293; Purves v'. Landell, 12 Clark & F. gi,
102-7; Kemp v. Burt, 4 Barn. & Ad. 424; Hart v. Frame, 6 Clark & F. 193;
Godefroy v. Dalton, 6 Bing. 46o; Laidler v. Elliot, 3 B. & C. 738; Baikie v.
Chandless, 3 Camp. i7; Pitt v. Yalden, 4 Burr, 2o6o; Bulmer v. Gilman, 4 M.
& G. xo8, X25; Parker v. Rolls, 14 C. B. 691; Goodman v. Walker (3o Ala.
482), 68 Amer. Dec. 134; Fitch v. Scott [3 How. (Miss.) 314], 34 Amer. Dec.
86; 34 Amer. Dec. 89, note; Citizen's Loan Fund, etc., Ass'n v. Friedley (123
Ind. 143), 18 Amer. St. Rep. 320; Babbitt v. Bumpus (73 Mich. 331), i6 Amer.
St. Rep. 585; Ahlhauser v. Butler et al., 57 Fed. R. 121; National Savings
Bank v. Ward, ioo U. S. 195; 28 Amer. Law Reg. 536-546; Doster v. Scully,
27 Fed. Rep. 782.
33 21 Wallace 178.
84 Weeks on Attorneys § 295; 3 Black. Com. x63.
85 Weeks on Attorneys §§ 295, 300; 3 Black. Com., 163-4; 7 Com. Dig. 756;
Com. Dig., Action on the case for a deceit; Cooley on Torts 618, 2d ed.;
Dearborn v. Dearborn, i5 Mass. 316; Stevens v. Walker & Dexter, 55 Ill.
xsI; Cochrane v. Little (7i Md. 323), x8 Atl. Rep. 698; 2 Chit. Pl. 373, note;
Laidler v. Elliot, 3 B. & C. 738; Kemp v'. Burt, 4 Barn. & Ad. 424; and many
other cases cited in preceding notes.
86 2 Chit. PL 373, note; Wilcox et at. v. Plummer, 4 Peters 172; Varnum
et al. v. Martin, 15 Pick. 44o; Hopping v'. Quin, 12 Wend. 517; Babbitt v.
Bumpus (73 Mich. 331), x6 Amer. St. Rep. 585; and many cases in the preced-
ing notes; Weeks on Attorneys, § 300.
87 Pomeroy's Code Remedies, §44.
S 2 Shearman & Redfield on Neg. § 565; Cochrane v. Little et al. (71 Md.
323), 18 Atl Rep. 698; Walpole's Adm'r. vi. Carlisle, 32 Ind. 415; Reece v.
Righy, 4 Barn. & Ad. 202; Hunter v'. Caldwell, xo Qu. B. (Ad. & EL N. S.), 69.
81-2; Hill v. Featherstonhaugh, 7 Bing. 569; Bracey v. Carter, 12 A. & E.
373- Weeks on Attorneys, § 297; 34 Amer. Dec. go, note; contra, Gambert v.
Hart, 44 Cal. 542.
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fraud is wanting, the only one who may maintain the action
against the attorney for negligent and erroneous advice, is the
one who has consulted the attorney in such a way as to cause
the relation of attorney and client to spring up.8 9 For it is
the relationship of attorney and client which creates the legal
duty or raises the .quasi-contract to enforce which the action is
brought. Neither the payment of a retaining fee nor any com-
pensation by the client is essential to the subsistence of this rela-
tionship. 40 But, if the erroneous advice be given fraudulently
or collusively, then whoever has a right reasonably to rely upon
it and is deceived thereby to his damage, may maintain his action.4
Otherwise, the attorney is not liable to one who is not his client.42
Nor is he liable for advice given in response to a casual inquiry, a
so-called "street opinion. "4
The burden of proof in all cases rests upon the client to prove
the existence of the duty on the part of the attorney, the breach
thereof, and the resultant damage to himself. 4 Although the rule
is otherwise, some authorities hold that the action cannot be sus-
tained even for nominal damages without proof of actual loss.4 5
The universal measure of damages in this class of cases is the loss
actually sustained by the client as the natural and proximate con-
39 National Savings Bank v. Ward, ioo U. S. 195; Dundee Mortgage, etc.,
Co. v. Hughes, 2o Fed. Rep. 39; Robertson v. Fleming, 4 Macq. Scotch App.
Cases, 167, 177, 200; Cooley on Torts, 780, 2d ed. ; Fish v. Kelly, 17 C. B. N. S.
194, 205; 2 Shearman & Redfield on Neg. § 562: for exception to the rule, cf.
Nat'l Savings Bank v. Ward, supra, and Levy v. Langridge, 2 M. & W. 519,
531, and 4 M. & W. 337; Weeks on Attorneys, §§ 127, 293.
40 Weeks on Attorneys, § 313; Donaldson v'. Haldane, 7 CL & F. 762, 770-
3; Cooley on Torts, 780, 2d ed.; 2 Shearman & Redfield on Neg. § 562.
41 Fish v. Kelly, 17 C. B. N. S. 194, 205; National Savings Bank v. Ward,
zoo U. S. 195; Fairfield County Bar v. Taylor (6o Conn. ii), 22 AtM Rep. 441;
Weeks on Attorneys, § 127; see also authorities cited in note 14; cf. Derry v.
Peek, L. R. 14 App. Cas. 337; and Litchfield v. Hutchinson, 117 Mass. 195.
42 See authorities cited in note 39.
48 Fish v. Kelly, 17 C. B. N. S. 194, 205; Cooley on Torts, 780 2d ed.;
Weeks on Attorneys, § 292.
44 2 Shearman & Redfield on Neg. § 566; Quinn v. Pelt, 56 N. Y. 417;
Weeks on Attorneys, §§ 293, 298.
45 In support of rule, see Weeks on Attorneys, §§ 292, 293; Godefroy v.
Jay, 7 Bing. 413, 419; 2 Shearman & Redfield on Neg. § 573; contra, Fitch v.
Scott [3 How. (Miss.) 314], 34 Amer. Dec. 86; Jay v. Morgan, 35 Minn. 184,
cited in 28 Amer. Law Reg. 539; ibidem 545; Weeks on Attorneys, § 299,.p.
596 in 2d ed.
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sequence of his acting in reliance upon his attorney's advice,46 and
the amount of such loss is to be ascertained by the jury.47
But clients less frequently seek the aid of the courts to enforce
this liability, than they interpose the plea of negligence as a
defense to an action by the attorney for his fees. At common law
it would seem that the client could not avail himself of this defense
under the general issue unless he had, by reason of the attorney's
negligence, lost all possibility of benefit from the attorney's ser-
vices.48 But no reason appears why such defense, though going
to reduce ihe damages merely, could not have been employed, pro
tanto, under a plea of confession and avoidance; and the attorney's
negligence might have been made thi foundation of a cross
action.49 Negligence of the attorney causing damage to his client
is undoubtedly a good defense under code practice, whether it
goes to destroy, or merely to reduce, the value of his services. °
But not, if the client subsequently with full knowledge ratifies his
attorney's action and accepts the benefits thereof. 51 Fraudulent
conduct on the part of the attorney is likewise a good defense. 2
The right of the client to sue his attorney for injury caused by
the latter's fraudulent or negligent advice may be barred by the
Statute of Limitations, or be defeated by the client's consenting
46 28 Amer. Law Reg. 545; Stevens v. Walker & Dexter, 55 I1. 417, S. C.
79 Ill. 193; Quinn v. Van Pelt, 56 N. Y. 417; 2 Shearman & Redfield on Neg.
§ 753, cf. § 567, note; Sedgwick on Damages, § 831, 8th ed.; Whiteman v.
Hawkins, L. R. 4 C. P. Div. 13, 19; Eccles v. Stephenson, 3 Bibb. 517, 520;
Cox v. Sullivan (7 Ga. r44), 50 Amer. Dec. 386; Cox v. Livingston [2 Watts &
Serg. (Penn.) 103], 37 Amer. Dec. 486; Pennington's Ex'rs v. Yell (rx Ark.
212), 52 Amer. Dec. 262; 34 Amer. Dec. 95-6, note; Weeks on Attorneys, §§
293, 319.
47 28 Amer. Law Reg. 545, note; Eccles v'. Stevenson, 3 Bibb (Ky.) 517,
520; 34 Amer. Dec. 95-6, note.
48 Sedg. on Damages, § X037, 8th ed.; Gleason v. Clark, 9 Cowen, 57; Hill
v. Featherstonhaugh, 7 Bing. 569; Bracey v. Carter, 12 A & E. 373, 376;
Templer v. McLachlan, 2 B. & P. N. R. 136; Huntley v. Bulwer, 6 Bing. N.
C. iix; Hopping v. Quinn, x2 Wend. 517; Weeks on Attorneys, §§ 302, 341;
cf. Montriou v. JeiEries, 2 Car. & P. 313; Elkington v. Holland, 9 M. & W.
659.
49 Weeks on Attorneys, § 302, 34'.
50 Weeks on Attorneys, § 341. Caverley v. McOwen, 123 Mass. 574;
Bowman v. Tallman, 4o How. Pr. R. i (N. Y. C't of App.); Reilly v. Cava-
naugh, 29 Ind. 435.
Si Weeks on Attorneys, § 247; The U. S. Mort. Co. v. Henderson et al.,
xi Ind. 24, 34.
52 Weeks on Attorneys, § 34'; Brackett z. Norton (4 Conn. 5T7), io Amer.
Dec. z7g; Dickinson v. Bradford (59 Ala. 581), 3 Amer. Rep. 23; ef. the
authorities cited in notes xx and 13.
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thereto, or by the client's negligence materially contributing to
his own loss. The Statute of Limitations runs from the accruing
of the right of action, i.e., the act of negligence, unskillfulness, or
fraud. 5
Besides the client's remedy by action at law for damage caused
by his attorney's erroneous advice, there is the more speedy rem-
edy by invoking the exercise of the court's summary jurisdiction.
If the damage due to the erroneous advice is ascertained, and if
such advice was given by the attorney in his professional capacity
fraudulently, the court, whether of law or of equity, may issue a
rule requiring the attorney to show cause why he should not be
ordered to compensate his client for such damage.54 Or, the rule
may be to show cause why an attachment should not issue against
him. 5 And, in some cases, when the negligence or misconduct
is flagrant, this remedy may be granted even though the client
does not claim fraud on the part of the attorney. 56 If either rule
is made absolute, the client is adequately compensated without the
delay incident to an action at law. And this remedy may be
invoked by one, not a client, who has suffered loss through an
attorney's having negligently given erroneous advice to a court of
chancery concerning a trust fund in court, even though fraud is
not so much as suspected. 57 The ground for the exercise of this
authority is the right inherent in the court to protect the dignity of
the administration of justice from the reproaches to which the
malpractice or fraudulent conduct of its officers would subject it.5
The remedy afforded to the client is incidental merely to this
higher purpose.
A bill in equity will lie to have the attorney decreed a trustee
by construction of law, where, as a result of his erroneous advice,
he has gained possession of, or title to, property which ought, in
58 Wilcox et al. v. Plummer, 4 Peters, X72; Rhines' Adm'rs v. Evans, 66
Penn St. 192; 38 Amer. Dec. 270, note; Roberts v. Armstrong's Adm'r [i
Bush (Ky.) 263], 89 Amer. Dec. 624; Weeks on Attorneys, § 320; Wood on
Limitations, § 122.
54 Cooley on Torts, 618, 2d ed.; Weeks on Attorneys, §§ 77, 94; cf. in re
Dangar's Trusts, L. R. 41 Ch. Div. 178; Perry on Trusts, §§ 202, 203; Pitt V.
Yalden, 4 Burr, 2o6o.
55 Weeks on Attorneys, §§ 94, 97; 4 Black. Com. 283-287; I Comyn's Dig.
758.
56 Pitt v. Yalden, 4 Burr, 2060; Weeks on Attorneys, % 77, 97; In re Dan-
gar's Trusts, L. R. 41 Ch. Dir. 178, 196-7.
57 In re Dangar's Trusts, L. R., 41 Ch. Div. 178, 196-7.
58 Weeks on Attorneys, § 77; 4 Black. Com. 284; In re Dangar's Trusts,
L. R. 41 Ch. Div. 178, 196-7.
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fairness and honesty, to go to the client, and the court will compel
the attorney to execute such trust.59 In cases of acttial fraud the
remedy will be summarily decreed. 60 The relation of attorney and
client being one of special trust and confidence, any unfair advan-
tage taken of this- relationship will be closely scrutinized, and
slight unfairness will be seized by the court as affording ground
for granting appropriate relief. In all dealings between attorneys
and clients, the former must display the highest degree of good
faith, and advise their clients fully as to their legal rights and all
other matters essential to enable the clients to stand upon an equal
footing with them in the transaction.61 But laches will bar the
plaintiff's right to maintain a bill in equity for the wrong done
him. 62
And it is generally held that equity has no jurisdiction to make
the solicitor or attorney-his motives being honest-responsible to
his client for mere negligence or imprudence, especially while the
loss or injury is only apprehended. 63
To the court as well as to the client, the attorney owes the duty
of exercising care, skill and integrity, whether in advising the
court or a client. For, in so advising, provided the advice be
within the scope of his professional duties, he acts in the capacity
of an officer of the court. And upon this ground the court has
jurisdiction and authority to remove its incompetent servant by
striking him from the rolls. 64 But this authority will rarely be
60 Perry on Trusts, 202-3; cf. Weeks on Attorneys, t 296.
60 Perry on Trusts, § 203; cf. authorities cited in note 54.
61 Perry on Trusts, § 202; Cooley on Torts, 616-6x8, 2d ed.; Bispham's
Principles of Equity, § 92, 93, 231, 232, 236, 238; Bingham v. Salene, 3 Amer.
St. Rep. 152; Kisling v. Shaw (33 Cal. 425), 91 Amer. Dec. 644; Miles V.
Ervin, 16 Amer. Dec. 623; Henry v. Raiman (25 Penn. St. 354), 64 Amer.
Dec. 703; -Rogers v. Marshall, 13 Fed. Rep. 59; Pacific R. R. Co. v. Ketchum,
1i U. S. 289; also the authorities cited in note ix.
62 Weeks on Attorneys, § 94, P. 198; Perry on Trusts, § 202; especially if
no substantial injustice be done.
63 Franklaud v. Lucas, 4 Sim. 586; British Mut. Investment Co. v. Cob-
bold, L. R. ig Eq. 627; Chapman v. Chapman, L. R. 9 Eq. 276, 296; contra,
in re Dangar's Trusts, L. R. 41 Ch. Div. 178, x96-7, in case of solicitor.
64 Weeks on Attorneys, §§ 77, 80, 8i; 3 Black. CoM. 26-29; In re Wallace,
L. R. z P. C. 283; see note in 4o Amer. Rep. 642; Delano's case (58 N. H.
5), 42 Amer. Rep. 555; Fx. piarte Brownsall, Cowp. 829; Anderson V. Bos-
worth (i5 R. 1. 443), 2 Amer. St. Rep. 91o; see note in 2 Amer. St. Rep. 847;
People v. Appleton (io5 IIL 474), 44 Amer. Rep. 812; 95 Amer. Dec. 333-345,
note; 13 Fed. Rep. 82o, note; Ex airte Garland, 4 Wall. 333; Re Titus (Sup.
Ct.), 50 N. Y. S. R. 636; Perry on Trusts, § 846.
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exercised save as punishment for breaches of integrity,65 as for
fraudulently giving erroneous advice 66 to the damage of the client,
or for some other breach of his official oath. 7  But it is probable
that, if the erroneous advice should indicate so great a degree of
ignorance, or so great want of care and diligence as to demonstrate
the attorney's utter unfitness to discharge the duties of his office,
the court would on this ground alone disbar him.68 For the gen-
eral rule is, that the court has power to strike its attorneys from
the rolls on the ground of unfitness to be members of the pro-
fession. 69
William Bradford Bosley.
68 See generally the authorities cited in note 64; 2 Shearman & Redfield
on Neg. § 56x; Weeks on Attorneys, § 83.
68 Fairfield County Bar v,. Taylor (6o Conn. ii), 22 AUt. Rep. 441.
87 Weeks on Attorneys, § 8o, pp. 16o, 163; Strout v. Proctor, 7I Me. 288.
88 Contra, Bryant's case, 24 N..H. 149 (i851); but this decision proceeded
on the ground that the statute prescribed no educational qualifications for
admission to practice.
69 Ezjfarte Cole, i McCrary 4o5; see note in 13 Fed. Rep. 820; Dicken's
case (67 Penn. St 169), 5 Amer. Rep. 420; Exfarte Robinson, ig Wall. 505,
512; Weeks on Attorneys, § 8o, p. x56.
